The relationship between employees' objective internal and external pay standing and their job performance: A within-person analysis by Sieweke, J. et al.
VU Research Portal
The relationship between employees' objective internal and external pay standing and
their job performance: A within-person analysis
Sieweke, J.; Koellner, Bianca; Suess, Stefan
published in
Journal of Business and Psychology
2017
DOI (link to publisher)
10.1007/s10869-016-9457-6
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Sieweke, J., Koellner, B., & Suess, S. (2017). The relationship between employees' objective internal and
external pay standing and their job performance: A within-person analysis. Journal of Business and Psychology,
32(5), 533-546. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-016-9457-6
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 13. Sep. 2021
ORIGINAL PAPER
The Relationship Between Employees’ Objective Internal
and External Pay Standing and Their Job Performance:
A Within-Person Analysis
Jost Sieweke1 • Bianca Köllner2 • Stefan Süß1
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Abstract
Purpose Researchers have paid little attention to the
relationship between employees’ objective internal and
external pay standing and their job performance. Moreover,
few studies have considered that employees’ objective pay
standing is dynamic; that is, it changes over time. In this
study, we analyze the relationship between changes in
employees’ objective internal and external pay standing
and their job performance.
Design/Methodology/Approach We test the hypotheses
using data for players in the National Basketball Associa-
tion over a period of 12 seasons (n = 4830).
Findings Decreases in employees’ objective internal and
external pay standing are negatively related to their task
performance. Furthermore, decreases in employees’
objective internal pay standing, but not in their external pay
standing, are negatively related to their contextual
performance.
Implications Analyzing the relationship between changes
in employees’ objective internal and external pay standing
and their job performance adds to our understanding of the
individual-level consequences of pay dispersion.
Originality/Value This is one of the first studies to analyze
the relationship between employees’ objective internal and
external pay standing and their job performance. Moreover,
this is one of the first studies that considers that employees’
objective internal and external pay standing changes, for
example, because the external and internal labor markets
change. The study contributes to research on employee
compensation and salary, and to research on pay
disparities.
Keywords Pay disparities  External and internal pay
standing  Pay dispersion  Job performance  Salary 
Within-person design
Introduction
Employee compensation affects employee attitudes and
behaviors (Downes and Choi 2014; Gupta and Shaw 2014)
and organizational performance (see, e.g., Brick et al.
2006). Research indicates that an employee’s actual pay
level and relative pay level are important predictors of
attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Rynes et al. 2004). Relative
pay level refers to the individual’s salary compared to other
referents, such as colleagues or employees in other orga-
nizations. The consensus is that pay dispersion—that is, the
extent of ‘‘differences in pay levels between individuals’’
in an organization (Shaw 2014, p. 522)—is crucial for
organizations.
Much attention has been paid to the individual-level
consequences of pay disparities (for a review, see Shaw
2014). Researchers have distinguished between internal
pay disparities, which are defined as differences in
employee pay within an organization, and external pay
disparities, which refer to pay differentials between orga-
nizations. Studies have shown that employees’ pay relative
to colleagues (i.e., internal pay standing) and their salary
relative to employees in other organizations who perform
similar tasks (i.e., external pay standing) are related to
employee behavior and attitudes, such as pay satisfaction
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(see, e.g., Harris et al. 2008; Williams et al. 2006),
absenteeism (see, e.g., Della Torre et al. 2015), and turn-
over (see, e.g., Wade et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2015). These
studies have contributed to our understanding of how
employees react to pay disparities. However, two important
gaps remain: First, although several studies analyzed the
relationship between employees’ internal pay standing and
their job performance (see, e.g., Bloom 1999; Pfeffer and
Langton 1993), researchers have paid little attention to the
relationship between employees’ external pay standing and
their job performance, although job performance is one of
the most important individual-level outcome variables (see
Cascio and Aguinis 2008; Varela and Landis 2010); for
instance, Campbell and Wiernik (2015, p. 48) argued that
‘‘without individual performance there is no team perfor-
mance, no unit performance, no organizational perfor-
mance, no economic sector performance, no GDP.’’ Thus,
scholars have called for research that analyzes the rela-
tionship between employees’ external pay standing and
their job performance (Leana and Meuris 2015).
Second, many prior studies have assumed that
employees’ internal and external pay standing is static.
Thus, researchers (e.g., Bloom 1999; Seo et al. 2015) have
analyzed differences between individuals with high and
low pay standing (i.e., the between-person effect). How-
ever, internal and external pay standing might be subject
to changes over time; for instance, employees might
receive a pay raise, or the salary of external or internal
pay referents might increase. This dynamic perspective
has thus far received little attention, although this per-
spective on employee pay standing is different. Instead of
focusing on differences between employees who differ in
internal and external pay standing, the dynamic perspec-
tive focuses on the question how employees react if their
internal and external pay standing changes (i.e., within-
person effect).
This study aims to address these gaps by analyzing the
relationship between changes in employees’ objective
external and internal pay standing and their job perfor-
mance. The analysis is based on data from players in the
National Basketball Association (NBA). This article con-
tributes to the literature in two ways. First, we contribute to
research on pay dispersion by introducing a dynamic per-
spective. Few studies have considered that employee
objective pay standing is subject to changes, for example, if
market wages increase (Williams et al. 2006). This study
provides first insights into how such changes in employees’
external and internal pay standing are related to their job
performance.
Second, we contribute to research on the individual-
level consequences of pay disparities. Although several
prior studies analyzed the relationship between pay
standing and employee attitudes (e.g., pay satisfaction,
see Williams et al. 2006) and behaviors (e.g., absen-
teeism, see Della Torre et al. 2015), scholars have rarely
analyzed how employee pay standing is associated with
job performance (for an exception, see Bloom 1999),
particularly regarding employee external pay standing.
The present study provides such an analysis. Further-
more, we distinguish between employees’ task perfor-
mance and their contextual performance to provide
detailed insights into individual-level consequences of
pay disparities.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Pay and Job Performance
Managers often assume that pay is of little importance to
employees (Rynes et al. 2004; Sanders et al. 2008), perhaps
based on the self-reports of employees who say that they
attach little significance to their salary. However,
researchers have challenged this belief and provided evi-
dence that pay is an important motivator for employees
(see Leana and Meuris 2015).
Research on pay effects can be broadly classified into
two perspectives (see Leana and Meuris 2015). The first
perspective analyzes the effects of employees’ actual pay.
For instance, Jenkins et al.’s (1998) meta-analysis indi-
cated that higher financial rewards (e.g., salary) are posi-
tively related to performance quantity, but not quality (see
also Garbers and Konradt 2014). Salary is also related to
employees’ turnover decisions (see, e.g., Wade et al. 2006)
and job satisfaction (see Judge et al. 2010). The second
perspective focuses on the effects of income comparisons.
According to this perspective, salary has a symbolic
meaning; it expresses how much an organization values an
employee. Theories such as relative deprivation theory
(Crosby 1976) and equity theory (Adams 1963, 1965)
indicate that whether employees perceive their pay as being
fair depends on their pay compared to the pay of referent
others (e.g., colleagues or employees in other organiza-
tions). Several studies have shown that employees’ pay
relative to referents is associated with work-related atti-
tudes, such as pay equity perceptions (e.g., Trevor and
Wazeter 2006), perceived pay fairness (e.g., Shore et al.
2006), and pay satisfaction (e.g., Williams et al. 2006), and
behaviors, such as absenteeism (see, e.g., Della Torre et al.
2015) and turnover (see, e.g., Wade et al. 2006; Wang et al.
2015).
Both perspectives provide important insights into how
pay affects employee attitudes and behavior. In the fol-
lowing, we concentrate on the income comparison per-
spective, although we acknowledge that actual pay is also
associated with employee attitudes and behaviors.
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Pay Dispersion and Pay Standing
Today, many organizations have introduced a compensa-
tion system in which pay is dispersed among employees;
researchers distinguish between horizontal pay dispersion,
which refers to pay differences between employees at the
same organizational level, and vertical pay dispersion,
which refers to pay differences between employees at
different hierarchical levels (see Trevor et al. 2012).
Employees give considerable attention to differences
between their actual salaries and those of referents (Brown
2001; Trevor and Wazeter 2006). How employees react to
pay differences depends on their pay standing—which is
defined as their pay compared to referents’ pay.
Researchers broadly distinguish employees’ internal pay
standing—which is defined as their pay compared to the
pay of colleagues within the same organization—and
employees’ external pay standing—which is defined as
their pay compared to the pay of referents outside the
organization. Because employees often lack information
about referents’ actual pay, employee pay standing is often
subjective, which means that it depends on employees’
beliefs about the salaries their referents received. However,
in the context of this study, objective information about
referents’ salaries is available, which is why we focus on
employees’ objective pay standing.
The relationship between employees’ pay standing and
their work-related attitudes and behaviors is often
explained using equity theory, which states that employees
strive for a balance between their inputs (e.g., effort at
work) and outcomes (e.g., salary) (Adams 1963). Individ-
uals determine whether their inputs and outcomes are
balanced by comparing their own input–outcome ratio with
the referents’ ratio (Downes and Choi 2014). If individuals
believe that referents have a more favorable input–output
ratio, they will reduce their efforts to improve their balance
(Shaw 2014). Several studies have provided evidence for
this prediction of equity theory. For instance, Trevor and
Wazeter (2006) found that employees’ internal and exter-
nal pay standing influences their pay equity perceptions.
Similarly, the meta-analysis by Williams et al. (2006)
showed that employees’ (perceived) internal and external
pay standing influences their pay satisfaction (see also
Harris et al. 2008).
Despite the contributions of these prior studies to our
knowledge of the consequences of pay disparities, we can
identify two gaps that impair our understanding: First,
researchers have thus far paid much attention to the influ-
ence of internal and external pay disparities on employee
attitudes and behaviors, but paid little attention to the
relationship between employee pay standing and job per-
formance (for exceptions, see Bloom 1999; Pfeffer and
Langton 1993), particularly regarding external pay
disparities (see Leana and Meuris 2015). Because
employee performance is an important individual-level
outcome variable (see, e.g., Campbell and Wiernik 2015;
Cascio and Aguinis 2008), we argue that an analysis of this
relationship is needed.
Second, prior studies have ignored that an employee’s
objective internal and external pay standing is subject to
change. For instance, an employee’s internal pay standing
increases if he or she receives a pay raise while his or her
colleagues’ salaries remain unchanged. Similarly, an
employee’s external pay standing decreases if his or her
salary remains unchanged while employees who perform
similar tasks in other organizations receive a pay raise.
Thus far, we know little about how employees react to
changes in internal and external pay standing, although
such changes are not uncommon.
In the following section, we develop hypotheses
regarding the relationship between changes in employees’
internal and external pay standing and their job perfor-
mance. Following prior studies (e.g., Motowidlo et al.
1997; Motowidlo and Van Scotter 1994), we distinguish
two dimensions of employees’ overall job performance:
task performance and contextual performance. Task per-
formance refers to an organization’s technical core and
involves activities such as transforming raw materials into
products (Motowidlo et al. 1997). Contextual performance
is related to maintaining the ‘‘organizational, social, and
psychological environment in which the technical core
must function’’ (Motowidlo et al. 1997, p. 75) and includes
aspects such as helping and assisting colleagues. By dis-
tinguishing the dimensions of employee job performance,
this study provides more detailed insights into the rela-
tionship between employee objective pay standing and job
performance.
The Relationship Between Employees’ Objective
Internal Pay Standing and Their Job Performance
In the first step, we focus on the relationship between
changes in employees’ objective internal pay standing and
their task performance and contextual performance.
Employees’ objective internal pay standing increases if
they receive a pay raise while their colleagues’ salary
remains unchanged, or if the employees’ pay raise is higher
than their colleagues’ pay raise. Employees’ objective
internal pay standing decreases if their colleagues receive a
pay raise while the employees’ salaries remain unchanged,
or if the employees’ pay raise is lower than that of their
colleagues.
We expect that decreases in employees’ objective
internal pay standing are negatively related to their task
performance. Theories such as equity theory (Adams
1963, 1965) and the fair wage–effort hypothesis (Akerlof
J Bus Psychol (2017) 32:533–546 535
123
and Yellen 1990) indicate that employees compare their
salary with those of colleagues in their company (Trevor
and Wazeter 2006; Wheeler and Miyake 1992). Such
comparisons might result in perceptions of inequity if the
employees believe that they earn less than they should
compared to their colleagues or in perceptions of equity if
the employees believe that their salary is fair compared to
that of their colleagues (Shore et al. 2006; Trevor and
Wazeter 2006). We contend that employees will perceive
they are being treated unfairly if their internal pay standing
decreases. As indicated by equity theory (Adams 1963),
employees compare their input–output ratio to their col-
leagues’ input–output ratio. If the employees’ colleagues
receive a pay raise, their input–output ratio improves
because they receive more outputs for the same input.
Although the (objective) input–output ratio of employees
who received no pay raise is not affected by their col-
leagues’ pay raise, the employees’ input–output ratio
becomes less favorable compared to that of their col-
leagues. Therefore, the employees will feel they are being
treated unfairly by their employer.
Equity theory and the fair wage–effort hypothesis predict
that employees will withdraw their effort when they perceive
they are being treated unfairly by their employer, and
empirical studies provide evidence for the relationship
between perceptions of pay equity and employees’ effort at
work. For instance, Gächter and Thöni’s (2010) laboratory
experiment revealed that employees reduce their efforts if
the individuals receive less money than their coworkers.
Cohn et al. (2014) found that decreasing salaries undermines
employee efforts, and that the negative effect was twice as
large when only one worker’s salary was cut while the ref-
erent’s salary remained unchanged. Based on these findings
and the predictions of the theories, we expect that decreases
in employees’ objective internal pay standing will be related
to lower motivation and less effort at work, which negatively
affects task performance. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a Decreases in employees’ objective internal
pay standing are negatively related to their task
performance.
In addition, we expect that decreases in employees’
objective internal pay standing are negatively related to
their contextual performance. Equity theory (Adams 1963)
indicates that employees will feel they are being treated
unfairly by their employer when their objective internal
pay standing decreases. The perception of being treated
unfairly is negatively associated with employees’ citizen-
ship behavior (e.g., helping colleagues), as several studies
has shown.1 For instance, Skarlicki and Latham’s (1996)
experimental study showed a positive relationship between
employees’ fairness perceptions and citizenship behavior
toward the organization and toward colleagues. Similarly,
the meta-analysis by Organ and Ryan (1995) showed a
high correlation between perceived fairness and organiza-
tional citizenship behaviors. Therefore, we assume that
employees will reduce their citizenship behaviors when
their objective internal pay standing decreases, because
they will feel they are being treated unfairly by their
employer.
Furthermore, we argue that employees will refrain from
cooperating with colleagues when the employees’ objec-
tive internal pay standing decreases because of envy (see,
e.g., Tai et al. 2012). If employees’ objective internal pay
standing decreases, they might think that their colleagues
have taken money away from them. Consequently, the
employees will avoid cooperating with their colleagues and
assisting them, particularly those whose salary has
increased. Following these arguments, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1b Decreases in employees’ objective inter-
nal pay standing are negatively related to their contextual
performance.
The Relationship Between Employees’ Objective
External Pay Standing and Their Job Performance
In the second step, we focus on the relationship between
changes in employees’ objective external pay standing and
their task performance and contextual performance.
Employees’ external pay standing increases if they receive
a pay raise while market wages for a similar job remain
unchanged or if the increase in the employees’ salary
exceeds the increases in market wages. Employees’
objective external pay standing decreases if market wages
increase while the employees’ salary remains unchanged or
if increases in the employees’ salary lag behind the market.
We expect that decreases in employees’ objective
external pay standing are negatively related to their task
performance. Similar to the arguments related to hypoth-
esis 1a, we assume that decreases in employees’ objective
external pay standing influence their perceptions of equity
and thus affect task performance. Particularly, decreases in
employees’ objective external pay standing indicate that
the employees’ input–output ratio compared to that of
referents in other organizations worsens. Equity theory
(Adams 1963) predicts that such a change will negatively
affect the employees’ equity perceptions. Thus, equity
theory (Adams 1963, 1965) and the fair wage–effort
hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen 1990) indicate that the
1 Although the construct’s contextual performance and (organiza-
tional) citizenship behaviors are distinct, they capture similar
Footnote 1 continued
behaviors (e.g., helping colleagues) (Motowidlo 2000). Therefore, we
refer to both constructs.
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employees will invest less effort in their work, which will
negatively affect their task performance. Following these
arguments, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2a Decreases in employees’ objective exter-
nal pay standing are negatively related to their task
performance.
We further assume that decreases in employees’ objective
external pay standing are negatively related to their con-
textual performance. Again, we explain the hypothesis with
equity theory (Adams 1963) and employees’ fairness per-
ceptions. Although employees will not be envious of their
colleagues when the employees’ objective external pay
standing decreases, they will still feel they are being treated
unfairly by their employer. Equity theory predicts that
employees’ motivation and effort at work will be negatively
affected by the perception of unfair treatment, which will
negatively influence employees’ citizenship behavior. Fur-
thermore, employees might also avoid cooperating with
colleagues in order to harm their employer (see, e.g.,
Greenberg 1990). Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2b Decreases in employees’ objective exter-




We test the hypotheses using a sample of professional NBA
basketball players. We chose this research context for sev-
eral reasons. First, the sports setting is well-suited to this
study because salaries in that industry are almost completely
transparent and because of the existence of objective
information on employee job performance over time (Berri
et al. 2007). Further, previous studies have shown that the
findings from pay research in professional sports are gen-
eralizable to for-profit organizations (Day et al. 2012; Shaw
2014). Second, the NBA is a suitable research context
because the NBA season is long enough (82 games) to avoid
small sample bias in job performance, which is often the
case in sports such as American football, which has fewer
regular season games (16 games) and thus more variable job
performance (see Stewart and Nandkeolyar 2007). Addi-
tionally, prior research on the effects of pay dispersion has
mostly been conducted in settings with low task interde-
pendence (see Trevor et al. 2012). However, work in orga-
nizations is often characterized by task interdependence.
Unlike sports such as baseball, basketball is a highly inter-
dependent activity (Timmerman 2000), which makes it a
good context for this study.
We collected longitudinal data on players over a period
of 12 seasons (from the 1999–2000 season to the
2010–2011 season). The time period was chosen because
the previous and subsequent seasons (1998–1999 and
2011–2012 seasons) were affected by player strikes, which
limit the comparability. We collected the data from www.
nba.com and www.basketball-reference.com; both websites
provide extensive statistics about the NBA and have been
used in previous studies (e.g., Beus et al. 2014; Sieweke
and Zhao 2015). We included only athletes who had played
at least 100 min over the course of a season in the analysis
to avoid confounding effects due to small sample bias.2
The final sample consisted of 1070 individuals who played,
on average, 4.5 seasons (n = 4830).
Variables
Task Performance
Various approaches to measuring the task performance of
basketball players have been suggested (for an overview,
see Berri 2012). Some studies operationalized task per-
formance using a single performance measure (e.g., points
scored per game, see Barnes et al. 2012). Although that
approach is reasonable, we decided to follow a previous
study (see Frey et al. 2013) that operationalized task per-
formance by constructing an aggregated measure that
considers that basketball players have to perform several
tasks simultaneously on the court (e.g., defending opposing
players, rebounding the ball, scoring). We used the fol-
lowing formula to measure player task performance (see
Frey et al. 2013, p. 9):
PERFij ¼

PTS  FGA  0:44  FTAð Þ
þ TREB þ STL  TO

=GP
PERFij is the task performance of player i in season j; PTS
is the total number of points scored by the player in the
respective season; FGA is the number of field goals (two-
point and three-point field goals) attempted by the player;
TREB is the total number of (offensive and defensive)
rebounds; STL is the total number of steals; and TO is the
total number of turnovers, i.e., lost possessions of the ball
(e.g., if an opponent steals the ball). The performance index
is divided by the total numbers of games played (GP). The
higher a player’s PERF, the greater his task performance.3
PERF correlates highly with several other measures of
player performance in the NBA (Player Efficiency Rating:
r (4830) = 0.71, p\ 0.001; Win Score: r (4830) = 0.85,
2 To check the robustness of the findings, we ran all the analyses with
altered parameters (at least 200 min played per season). The results
were similar.
3 Please note: the NBA is an exclusively male competition.
J Bus Psychol (2017) 32:533–546 537
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p\ 0.001; Win Shares per 48 min: r (4830) = 0.69,
p\ 0.001), which provides evidence for the validity of the
PERF measure.
Contextual Performance
Employees’ contextual performance refers to behaviors
such as helping and assisting colleagues. In the context of
the NBA, players can help each other in several ways,
such as setting screens to free up teammates. However,
prior studies (see, e.g., Berman et al. 2002; Beus and
Whitman 2015) indicate that the most obvious form of
collaboration is by passing the ball to colleagues to enable
them to score a basket. Such passes that lead to a field
goal are called ‘‘assists’’ in the NBA. In this study, we
measured a player’s contextual performance as the per-
centage of field goals the player assisted while on the
court (for a similar approach, see Beus and Whitman
2015). The higher the percentage, the higher is a player’s
contextual performance.
Player Salary
Player salary was measured as the annual amount of US
dollars a player receives from his organization as com-
pensation for his services. Following previous studies (e.g.,
Bloom 1999), we logarithmized player salary to take into
account that the relative difference between a salary of
US$100,000 and US$200,000 is larger than between a
salary of US$1,000,000 and US$1,100,000.
Internal Pay Standing
We operationalized objective internal pay standing as the
logarithmized median player salary per team. This
approach differs from previous approaches that used the
average salary a team paid to its players (see, e.g., Frey
et al. 2013) or the maximum salary (see, e.g., Bloom 1999).
We argue that the median salary is more appropriate than
the average salary because the median salary is less
affected by outliers (e.g., maximum salaries of about
US$20 million). Additionally, the median salary is also
more appropriate than the maximum salary, because it is
likely that players compare themselves with average
teammates instead of star players (see Frey et al. 2013).4
External Pay Standing
We operationalized objective external pay standing as the
logarithmized median player salary per position. We divi-
ded players into three groups according to the players’
position (guard, forward, and center), because we assume
that the players compare themselves with employees who
perform similar tasks in other organizations (Williams
et al. 2006). The assumption is supported by anecdotal
evidence from the NBA (see, e.g., Falk 2009). We used the
median salary because we assume that players will com-
pare their salaries with average players at their position
instead of star players.
Control Variables
We included several covariates. First, we control for
players’ organization-specific experience because it
influences job performance (Quinones et al. 1995). We
operationalized the variable as the number of seasons
each player has played for his current NBA team. Sec-
ond, we control for the influence of player talent, which
might influence individual performance and future sal-
aries. Following previous studies (Berman et al. 2002),
we used players’ draft number as a proxy for their level
of talent. We logarithmized the variable to account for
the fact that differences between two adjacent positions
early in the draft are more significant than differences
between two positions later in the draft (Berman et al.
2002). Third, college players often need some time to
adjust to the NBA; for instance, the different game rules
can undermine the players’ performance in their first
season. Therefore, we included a dummy variable that
was coded 1 if the player played his first season in the
NBA (0 otherwise). Fourth, all rookies drafted in the first
round of the NBA draft receive a 2-year guaranteed
contract with a fixed salary (see National Basketball
Association 2010). To control for whether these players
react differently to their pay standing, we included a
dummy variable that was coded 1 if the player received
a rookie salary scale (0 otherwise). Finally, we included
a dummy variable for each season to control for period
effects.
Data Analysis
Our data resemble a nested structure. At the lowest level
(level 1), there are observations at different points of time
that are nested within players (level 2), who are nested
within teams (level 3). The nesting might violate the
assumption of independence of observations, which biases
standard errors (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). We calcu-
lated the intraclass correlation (ICC)—the proportion of the
variation in the dependent variable that is explained on
each level—to determine whether to use ordinary least
squares (OLS) or multilevel models. For task performance,
the ICC for level 2 was 0.70, and the ICC for level 3 was
0.00; for contextual performance, the ICC for level 2 was4 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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0.90, and the ICC for level 3 was 0.002. The high ICC
values for level 2 indicate that the observations are not
independent, which violates the assumptions of OLS
(Hofmann 1997). Therefore, we used multilevel regression.
Because the ICC for the team level was very low for
both dependent variables, we estimated a two-level model
(level 1: within-person level; level 2: between-person
level) with random intercepts, which allows intercepts to
vary across individuals. Because the residuals of the
dependent variable deviated from normality, we followed
recommendations in the literature (see Maas and Hox
2004) and used maximum likelihood estimation with
robust standard errors (mixed, mle vce(robust) command in
Stata 14).
To test the hypotheses regarding changes in employees’
objective internal and external pay standing, we followed
recommendations in the literature (Curran and Bauer 2011)
and decomposed the independent and control variables into
their between and within components (for a detailed
description, see Enders and Tofighi 2007). In the first step,
we calculated the mean for each cluster (player, team, and
position) over all seasons; this variable represents the
between effects (i.e., level 2). In the second step, we sub-
tracted this mean from the season-specific observation to
obtain a variable that is centered within the context; this
variable represents the within effect (i.e., level 1). Between
and within variables have different meanings. For instance,
the between variable of employee salary refers to the
average salary a player earned during his career, whereas
the within variable of employee salary should be inter-
preted as (temporary) deviation from the usual salary (i.e.,
the career average).
Some previous studies on pay standing created differ-
ence scores to test for the relationship between pay
standing and job performance, for example, by subtracting
the average team salary from the player salary (see, e.g.,
Frey et al. 2013). Although this approach is plausible, some
researchers (Edwards and Parry 1993; Shanock et al. 2010)
argued that difference scores suffer from unnecessary
constraints. Most importantly, the difference score
approach assumes that the coefficients of the variables that
form the difference score (e.g., player salary and median
player salary per team) are equal in magnitude. To avoid
such unnecessary constraints, researchers recommend
including the predictors as separate variables instead of
creating a difference score (Edwards and Parry 1993;
Shanock et al. 2010).5 This study follows this recommen-
dation; we included player salary, median player salary per
team (i.e., objective internal pay standing), and median
player salary per position (i.e., objective external pay
standing) as predictors in the multilevel regression. We test
the hypotheses by analyzing how player performance is
related to changes in the median player salary per team and
median player salary per position, while controlling for
player salary (see Harris et al. 2008).
Results
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics, correlations,
and variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables. The
findings show significant correlations between employee
task performance and the within effect of objective external
pay standing [r (4828) = 0.05; p\ 0.001] and objective
internal pay standing [r (4828) = 0.06; p\ 0.001], which
support the hypotheses. Moreover, we find that employee
salary is positively correlated with job performance at the
between-person level [r (4828) = 0.53; p\ 0.001] and the
within-person level [r (4828) = 0.08; p\ 0.001].
According to a recent study on correlational effect size
benchmarks in organizational psychology (Bosco et al.
2015), the median correlation between job performance
and objective person characteristics was about r = 0.09.
Therefore, the correlational effect sizes on the within-per-
son level represent small effects, whereas the between-
person correlation between employee salary and task per-
formance represents a large effect size.
There are also several high correlations between
covariates; for instance, between the between-person effect
of employee salary and player talent [r (4828) = 0.62;
p\ 0.001], which might indicate problems with multi-
collinearity. Table 1 shows that the VIFs for all variables
were below the critical level of 5 (VIFmax = 4.37;
VIFmean = 2.22), which indicates that multicollinearity did
not bias the findings.
The results of the multilevel analysis are presented in
Table 2, Models 1–6. Model 1 and Model 4 are the null
models, which include only the dependent variable (task
performance and contextual performance). Model 2 and
Model 5 include the control variables; the independent
variables are added in Model 3 and Model 6.
Hypothesis 1a posits that decreases in employees’
objective internal pay standings are negatively related to
the employees’ task performance. The results of the mul-
tilevel analysis (Table 2, Model 3) support the hypothesis;
the coefficient of the within effect of internal pay standing
is negative and significant (c = -0.30; p\ 0.001). The
finding indicates that a one standard deviation increase in
the median salary within an organization is related to an
approximate 3 % decrease in employee task performance.
Hypothesis 1b states that decreases in employees’
objective internal pay standing are negatively related to
their contextual performance. The coefficient of the within
effect of internal pay standing is negative and significant5 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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(c = -0.58; p = 0.001), which supports the hypothesis
(see Table 2, Model 6). The finding indicates that a one
standard deviation increase in the median salary within an
organization is related to an approximate 1.6 % decrease in
employee contextual performance.
Hypothesis 2a predicts that decreases in employees’
objective external pay standing are negatively related to
their task performance. The results of the multilevel anal-
ysis (Table 2, Model 3) support the hypothesis; the coef-
ficient of the within effect of external pay standing is
negative and significant (c = -0.62; p = 0.025). The
finding indicates that a one standard deviation increase in
the median salary on the external labor market is related to
an approximate 2.5 % decrease in employee task
performance.
Finally, hypothesis 2b states that decreases in employ-
ees’ objective external pay standing are negatively related
to their contextual performance. The coefficient (Table 2,
Model 6) is positive and nonsignificant (c = 0.63;
p = 0.339); therefore, the hypothesis was rejected.
Discussion
Employee compensation is an important topic for man-
agement research and practice. In addition to employees’
actual pay, differences in employees’ salaries have been
found to influence employee attitudes and behaviors.
Previous studies have paid little attention to the rela-
tionship between employees’ job performance and their
pay relative to that of their colleagues (i.e., internal pay
standing) and relative to that of employees in other
organizations who perform similar tasks (i.e., external
pay standing). Moreover, most prior studies assumed that
employees’ objective pay standing is static, although
changes in pay standing are common in practice. The
current study addressed these gaps. The findings of an
empirical study conducted in the NBA showed a nega-
tive relationship between decreases in players’ objective
internal and external pay standing and their task per-
formance. We also found that decreases in players’
objective internal pay standing are negatively related to
their contextual performance.
Overall, this study contributes to the literature in several
ways. First, the study contributes to research by introducing
a dynamic perspective on pay dispersion. Previous research
often assumed that employees hold a static position in the
pay hierarchy. Consequently, prior work has analyzed to
what extent the attitudes and behaviors of employees with
high and low pay standing differ from each other. These
prior studies provided important insights into between-
person relationships. However, employees’ pay standing is
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question is: how do employees react to such changes in
their pay standing? As researchers in disciplines such as
psychology (e.g., Curran and Bauer 2011) and management
studies (e.g., Dalal et al. 2014) indicated, relationships at
the within-person level can differ in sign, form, and mag-
nitude from relationships at the between-person level.
Thus, we would commit an ecological fallacy if we assume
that findings from the between-person level can be trans-
ferred to the within-person level. This study provides first
insights into the dynamic perspective on pay dispersion and
shows that a within-person perspective can contribute to a
better understanding of the consequences of pay dispersion.
However, future research should analyze in more detail the
within-person perspective. In particular, it will be inter-
esting to see whether the relationships identified in
between-person studies can be confirmed in within-person
studies.
Second, in line with previous research (e.g., Trevor and
Wazeter 2006; Wade et al. 2006), this study indicates the
need to consider employees’ internal and external pay
standing, because employee perceptions of the fairness of
their salaries are influenced by comparisons with internal
and external referents. However, previous research tended
to pay greater attention to the consequences of internal pay
comparisons (Dulebohn and Werling 2007; Shaw 2014),
particularly regarding the relationship between employee
pay standing and job performance (e.g., Bloom 1999;
Pfeffer and Langton 1993). Therefore, Leana and Meuris
(2015) recently recommended—based on a comprehensive
review—that research on pay dispersion should also focus
on the consequences of employees’ comparisons with
external referents. The findings of the present study support
the claim. Changes in employees’ objective internal and
external pay standing are related to their job performance.
An implication of this finding is that researchers should
include internal and external perspectives when analyzing
the consequences of pay dispersion. Whereas such an
approach is common for employee attitudes (see, e.g., the
meta-analysis conducted by Williams et al. 2006), it is less
common for employee behaviors (Leana and Meuris 2015).
However, we expect that external comparisons will become
more important in the near future because of the growing
pay transparency in the external labor market. Whereas in
the past, employees had difficulty obtaining accurate
information about the salaries of employees who perform
similar tasks in other organizations, such information is
relatively easy to gather today, because websites such as
salary.com offer employees an opportunity to collect
information about market wages. Therefore, we expect that
employees will increasingly compare their salary (also) to
referents in other organizations, which emphasizes the
importance of the external perspective for research on pay
dispersion.
Third, this study contributes to research on the conse-
quences of employees’ objective external pay standing. We
build on previous studies that analyzed the relationship
between external pay disparities and employee perceptions
of fairness and pay satisfaction; this study advances this
line of research by providing the first insights into the
relationship between employees’ objective external pay
standing and their task performance and contextual per-
formance. In addition to the relationship with employee
behavior, such as turnover (Wade et al. 2006) and absen-
teeism (Della Torre et al. 2015), external pay disparities are
related to employee task performance, but not to their
contextual performance. Thus, this study provides a more
comprehensive picture of the individual-level conse-
quences of external pay disparities.
Practical Implications
This study has implications for managerial practice. In
particular, the study highlights the complexity of com-
pensation systems. The findings indicate that companies
should consider the external labor market and the internal
labor market in their compensation systems, because
employees react to changes in their external and internal
pay standing. If market wages increase, for example,
because of a shortage of employees with the required
human capital, employees will react negatively if their
pay remains unchanged. Similarly, if the salary of
employees’ internal reference group increases, our find-
ings suggest that their job performance will decrease.
Therefore, we argue that it is important for managers to
consider this dynamic perspective, because it indicates
that changes in the external and internal labor markets can
affect employees’ task performance and contextual
performance.
We also assume that the relevance of the dynamic
perspective for managerial practice will increase in the
next few years. Whether increases in salaries in the
external and internal labor markets affect employee per-
formance depends on whether an employee has informa-
tion about such changes (Belogolovsky et al. 2016). We
have reasons to expect a growing pay transparency in the
external and internal labor markets. First, it is easy today
for employees to collect information about salaries on the
external labor market, because websites (e.g., salary.com)
publish the information. Therefore, managers should
consider salary increases in the external labor market to
avoid skilled employees moving to companies that pay
higher salaries. Second, in several countries we can see
attempts to promote pay transparency within organiza-
tions, to reduce discrimination, for example, against
women or minorities. For instance, US President Barack
Obama issued Executive Order 13665, which forbids
542 J Bus Psychol (2017) 32:533–546
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companies, as long as they are federal contractors, from
discharging employees who discuss or disclose their pay
(see Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
2015); similar laws are being discussed in countries such
as Germany (see Zdrzalek 2015). Thus, managers must be
aware that their employees have information about their
colleagues’ salaries, which indicates the need to take
approaches to reduce the potential negative effects of the
transparency.
However, it is important for managers to recognize that
paying higher salaries to employees is positively related
to an organization’s financial performance only if the
additional outputs produced by employees exceed the
costs of higher wages. When costs outstrip benefits,
higher salaries might negatively affect organizational
profitability in the long run.
Limitations and Future Research
The results should be interpreted in light of the study’s
limitations. First, the findings are constrained by the object of
investigation, namely, sports teams. For instance, salaries in
the NBA are higher than in most companies, which might
influence individuals’ reactions to external wage disparities,
as indicated in previous studies (Bloom and Michel 2002).
Moreover, the NBA has several rules (e.g., salary cap,
maximum pay) that influence the teams’ compensation
decisions. Such rules are not found in other industries, which
also limits the generalizability of the findings. Finally, the
NBA is an exclusively male competition, which might fur-
ther limit the generalizability. However, a recent review of
the pay dispersion literature concluded that ‘‘the findings of
these studies [conducted in the sport context] seemed no
more disparate than those found in the broader literature’’
(Shaw 2014, p. 523). Additionally, studies indicate that men
and women react similarly to pay disparities (see Gilsdorf
and Sukhatme 2008). Therefore, we are confident that these
findings apply to other work environments. Nonetheless, we
recommend future research should analyze the conse-
quences of changes in an employee’s external and internal
pay standing in other industries.
Second, the panel data used in this paper have drawbacks,
although they are often regarded as superior to cross-sec-
tional data because they allow researchers to analyze chan-
ges over time (Ployhart and Ward 2011). Most notably, panel
data do not allow researchers to infer a causal relationship
between the independent and dependent variables. For
instance, the relationship between objective external pay
disparities and job performance might be biased by unob-
served effects or problems of reverse causation. Although we
tried to reduce the confounding effects by including vari-
ables that control for influences on the individual level, we
cannot preclude that these findings are biased by unobserved
variables. To test for a causal relationship between external
wage disparities and individual performance, we recom-
mend field experiments (see, e.g., King et al. 2013), which
have the advantage of high internal and external validity.
Third, this study provides no insights into the mechanisms
that mediate the relationship between employees’ objective
external and internal pay standing and their job performance.
It is important for researchers to gain more insights into these
mediators to better understand why changes in employees’
internal and external pay standing are related to job perfor-
mance. Following previous research (e.g., Bygren 2004;
Trevor and Wazeter 2006), we recommend focusing on
mediators such as employees’ effort and (pay) satisfaction.
Fourth, we lack information about the referents used by
NBA players when they compare their salaries. Although prior
studies indicated that it is reasonable to assume that players
compare their salaries with the salaries of players who play the
same position and perform similar tasks on the court (Trevor
and Wazeter 2006), it is possible that players choose other
referents; for instance, a player might compare his salary with
the salary of players who score a similar number of points or
with players who play a similar number of minutes. Therefore,
we recommend future research that collects primary data on
the referents with which employees compare their salary.
Finally, some top players (e.g., Tim Duncan, Dirk
Nowitzki) recently accepted salaries below their market
value to allow their teams to add top players to increase the
team’s chances of winning an NBA title. Because this trend
is new in the NBA, we expect no significant impact on the
findings. However, we recommend that future research
analyze which player characteristics (e.g., total amount of
salary received), organizational characteristics (e.g., small
market vs. large market team), and situational character-
istics (e.g., teammates who signed contracts below their
market value) that influence the decision.
Conclusions
Employees compare their salary with referents within and
outside their organization. We argue—and this study shows—
that it is important to consider the internal and external per-
spectives in research on pay disparities. Moreover, we extend
the current research on pay dispersion by focusing on within-
person relationships; that is, how employees react if their
(internal and external) pay standing changes. We hope that
this study stimulates further research on the consequences of
internal and external pay disparities and helps practitioners
design effective compensation systems.
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